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Table: Results of the Expert Survey

Referendum Pledges	The government pledged the referendum...							Number of Experts
	...to shore up its domestic support (Q1)	...to encourage divisions within the opposition (Q2)	...to defuse internal divisions on the issue within the government (Q3)	...to take the issue off the agenda of interparty competition (Q4)	...to further progress towards European unification (Q5)	...to strengthen its bargaining power at the European level (Q6)	...because it was judged the only way to obtain domestic ratification (Q7)	
France (1972) First Enlargement of EC	3.14 [1.12]	3.57 [1.40]	3.57 [1.05]	2.29 [1.03]	2.86 [1.25]	3.43 [1.18]	1.86 [1.36]	7
Norway (1972) Accession	2.00 [0.94]	1.44 [0.50]	3.33 [0.94]	4.00 [1.05]	1.22 [0.42]	1.78 [0.42]	2.89 [1.10]	9
Switzerland (1972) Free Trade Agreement	3.40 [1.36]	1.20 [0.40]	1.00 [0.00]	1.20 [0.40]	1.40 [0.80]	1.80 [0.98]	3.00 [1.41]	5
Britain (1975) Terms of Membership	3.80 [1.17]	3.20 [1.47]	5.00 [0.00]	2.40 [1.02]	1.20 [0.4]	2.00 [0.63]	1.80 [0.4]	5
Greenland (1982) Leaving the EC	2.00 [1.00]	1.00 [0.00]	1.00 [0.00]	1.00 [0.00]	1.00 [0.00]	2.50 [1.50]	1.00 [0.00]	4
Denmark (1986) SEA	4.40 [0.80]	2.80 [0.98]	1.60 [0.49]	4.20 [0.75]	2.40 [0.8]	1.60 [0.49]	4.20 [1.17]	5
Italy (1989) Constitution for Europe	2.40 [1.02]	1.40 [0.49]	1.60 [1.20]	1.80 [1.60]	3.40 [1.36]	2.00 [1.55]	1.00 [0.00]	5
France (1992) Maastricht	4.22 [0.79]	4.11 [0.99]	2.56 [0.68]	2.44 [0.96]	3.89 [0.74]	3.67 [1.15]	2.11 [1.45]	9
Switzerland (1992) European Economic Area	2.20 [0.98]	1.20 [0.40]	2.00 [0.63]	1.40 [0.49]	1.80 [0.98]	2.20 [0.75]	4.00 [1.55]	5
Finland/Åland Islands (1994) Accession	2.50/2.00 [0.50/0.00]	1.25/1.50 [0.43/0.50]	2.75/3.00 [0.43/0.00]	3.00/4.00 [1.41/1.00]	2.00/1.50 [0.00/0.50]	1.50/3.00 [0.50/0.00]	4.00/4.50 [0.70/0.50]	4
Sweden (1994) Accession	2.30 [1.19]	1.70 [0.64]	3.50 [0.81]	3.20 [0.98]	2.60 [0.92]	3.10 [1.64]	4.30 [0.78]	10
Britain (1996) Euro	3.80 [0.98]	2.00 [0.00]	4.60 [0.49]	3.00 [1.41]	1.00 [0.00]	2.00 [1.09]	3.40 [1.36]	5
Britain (1997) Euro	4.00 [1.09]	3.00 [1.41]	3.00 [0.89]	4.20 [0.98]	2.40 [1.02]	2.20 [0.75]	3.80 [1.17]	5
Malta (2003) Accession	4.25 [0.43]	3.50 [1.50]	1.25 [0.43]	2.75 [1.30]	2.50 [1.12]	2.50 [0.87]	3.50 [1.12]	4

Referendum Pledges	The government pledged the referendum to...							Number of Experts
	...to shore up its domestic support (Q1)	...to encourage divisions within the opposition (Q2)	...to defuse internal divisions on the issue within the government (Q3)	...to take the issue off the agenda of interparty competition (Q4)	...to further progress towards European unification (Q5)	...to strengthen its bargaining power at the European level (Q6)	...because it was judged the only way to obtain domestic ratification (Q7)	
Sweden (2003) Euro	2.20 [0.98]	1.80 [0.60]	3.20 [1.40]	3.00 [1.18]	2.20 [0.87]	2.60 [1.43]	4.00 [1.18]	10
Portugal (2003) TCE	3.25 [0.83]	2.75 [1.09]	1.75 [0.83]	2.25 [0.43]	2.50 [0.50]	2.50 [1.12]	3.00 [1.58]	4
Czech Republic (2003) Accession	2.50 [1.00]	2.38 [0.86]	1.13 [0.33]	2.13 [1.27]	2.86 [1.12]	2.50 [1.32]	1.63 [0.70]	8
Poland (2003) Accession	3.00 [1.15]	2.00 [1.15]	1.78 [0.79]	2.00 [0.82]	4.00 [1.25]	2.78 [1.40]	3.00 [1.49]	9
Britain (2004) TCE	4.20 [0.75]	2.20 [0.75]	2.60 [1.02]	4.20 [0.75]	2.00 [0.63]	2.00 [0.63]	2.60 [1.36]	5
France (2004) Accession of Turkey	3.78 [1.03]	2.67 [1.05]	3.11 [1.36]	3.11 [1.19]	2.11 [1.19]	3.22 [0.92]	2.50 [1.58]	9
Spain (2005) TCE	3.57 [0.90]	1.57 [0.49]	1.29 [0.45]	2.14 [0.99]	3.29 [1.16]	2.71 [1.16]	1.71 [1.03]	7
France (2005) TCE	4.00 [1.05]	4.00 [1.05]	3.11 [0.99]	2.22 [1.13]	2.78 [1.13]	3.22 [1.03]	2.00 [1.25]	9
Luxembourg (2005) TCE	2.80 [0.98]	2.40 [0.80]	2.00 [1.55]	2.20 [1.47]	4.60 [0.49]	3.60 [1.02]	1.40 [0.80]	5
Poland (2005) TCE	2.56 [0.68]	2.56 [0.96]	1.89 [1.10]	3.00 [1.25]	2.67 [1.15]	2.78 [1.03]	4.00 [1.00]	9
Czech Republic (2005) TCE	3.29 [1.03]	3.00 [1.07]	1.14 [0.35]	2.29 [1.16]	2.00 [0.93]	2.14 [0.99]	3.29 [1.28]	7
Austria (2008) Accession of Turkey	3.71 [1.28]	1.71 [1.03]	2.14 [0.83]	3.71 [1.28]	1.14 [0.35]	1.29 [0.45]	1.43 [0.73]	7
Britain (2010) Future transfers of power	3.80 [0.75]	1.80 [0.4]	3.40 [0.80]	2.00 [1.09]	1.00 [0.00]	2.40 [1.02]	1.80 [1.17]	5

Data: Expert survey. Mean values of expert responses. 1= the rationale played no role at all; 2=...only a marginal role; 3=...a somewhat important role; 4=...an important role; 5=...a very important role. Figures in square brackets: standard deviations